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Abstract 
This paper analyses asymmetric preferences for the monetary policies of the Visegrad Four (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). We extend Surico's (2007) asymmetric preference model to a small open economy in 
order to consider the exchange rate for a monetary policy framework as suggested by several earlier studies on the 
Visegrad Four. The results suggest that two asymmetries are evident in all the countries: an aversion to interest rates 
above the reference value and a preference for nominal exchange rate depreciation relative to the euro area. Moreover, 
the Czech policy does not exhibit any change in preferences during the recent financial crisis, while Poland responds 
aggressively.
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1. Introduction 
The  Visegrad  Four  (V-4),  which  consists  of  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia, have experienced large economic fluctuations because of rapid 
economic  reforms  and  repeated  financial  crises.  The  possibility  that  their  monetary 
policies require revision to deal with these fluctuations cannot be ruled out. Table 1 
shows the macroeconomic volatility ratios of these countries relative to the euro area. 
The  ratios  are  significantly  greater  than  1,  which  reflect  large  volatilities  in  these 
countries. 
This study adopts Surico’s (2007a) asymmetric preference model to consider the 
high volatilities in these countries. Moreover, we extend the model for a small open 
economy to consider the exchange rate. As explained in the literature review section, 
many studies suggest the importance of considering the exchange rate to analyze the 
monetary policy in the central and eastern European countries (CEECs). 
Surico’s (2007a) approach enables us to consider not only the implicit volatility 
component  of  the  policy  rule  but  also  the  flexible  objective  function  of  the  central 
banker.  Although  the  conventional  objective  of  monetary  policy  is  specified  as  a 
quadratic form around the origin, the linear exponential (Linex) loss function assumed 
in Surico (2007a) is allowed to swing left  or right around the origin.  The swing is 
stipulated by central banker’s preference parameter called the ―asymmetric parameter‖ 
and implies  that the central  banker  could  put  different  weight for the deviations of 
economic variable from its target. For instance, the output expansion and contract could 
generate a different size of loss under the assumption. The remarkable advantage of this 
approach  is  that  the  hypothesis  of  symmetric  preferences  can  be  tested  statistically 
through the estimation of asymmetric parameters. 
While the asymmetric preference induces the nonlinearity in the policy rule, the 
symmetric preference corresponds to a simple-linear rule as identified by Taylor (1993). 
Several  authors  have  challenged  the  conventional  linear-quadratic  framework  by 
assuming the objective asymmetry and/or the nonlinearity in the supply schedule since 
the nonlinear rule is generated by the assumptions. Nobay and Peel (2000) derived the 
nonlinear  policy  response  using  the  nonlinear  Phillips  curve;  later,  Nobay  and  Peel 
(2003) utilized objective asymmetry to this end. Further, Cukierman (2002) investigated 
the average inflation bias caused by the policy maker’s asymmetry to the business cycle, 
and Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002) estimated the nonlinear policy rule in the United 
States, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Bec et al. (2002) indicated that the nonlinear 
policy reaction, which arises from the asymmetric preference specifying the Heaviside 
loss  function,  could  be  observed  in  the  United  States,  Germany,  and  France.   2 
Ruge-Murcia (2003) presented evidence for the nonlinear response of the central bank 
and the aversion to positive unemployment in the United States. In addition, Dolado et 
al. (2004) examined both the asymmetry objective and the nonlinear Phillips curve to 
investigate  the  nonlinear  policy  response  in  the  United  States,  thereby  detecting  an 
aversion to inflation during Volcker-Greenspan period. Kim et al. (2005) implemented a 
series of statistical tests for the Fed’s nonlinear policy, indicating that the convexity of 
the  Phillips  curve  identified  by  Dolado  et  al.  (2005)  could  be  the  source  of  the 
nonlinearity. Moreover, Surico (2007b) suggested that there was an asymmetry in output 
expansion  in  the  pre-Volcker  US  policy.  More  recently,  Hasanov  and  Omay  (2008) 
estimated the nonlinear policy reaction function in Turkey and demonstrated a response 
asymmetry in which the bank reacts to output more aggressively during a recession than 
during a boom.
1 
In addition to the necessity of modifying the conventional framework based on 
their concepts, it is probable that the V-4’s monetary policies are affected by the recent 
sub-prime financial crisis. In order to examine the effect of the crisis on V-4’s policies, 
we  perform  a  subsample  estimation  and  infer  the  effects  of  the  crisis  on  their 
preferences. 
This paper obtains the following three results. First, Surico’s (2007a) model is 
supported in the Czech Republic and Poland, but not in Hungary and Slovakia. The 
implicit  variance  components  are  significant  in  the  former  countries,  but  the  model 
seems to be rather insufficient for the latter. Second, the extended model exhibits greater 
applicability to all four countries. In particular, the exchange rate terms become strongly 
significant. Moreover, as the common tendency of asymmetries in the V-4, an aversion 
to interest rates above the reference value and a preference for nominal exchange rate 
depreciation relative to the euro area are evident. Third, the Czech Republic exhibits no 
changes in its asymmetric preferences in the face of the crisis, while Poland responds to 
the crisis aggressively. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature on 
the estimations for CEECs’ monetary policy rule. Section 3 explains Surico’s (2007a) 
model first, and then extends the model to a small open economy. Section 4 shows the 
estimation results, and conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
2. Literature review 
An increasing number of studies have focused on the monetary policies of the 
                                                   
1  Omay and Hasanov (2008) found the nonlinearity in the inflation mean in Turkey and reported the 
regime dependent reaction of policymaker toward the inflation shocks. The regime dependence in 
Turkish policy is also detected in Hasanov et al. (2010).   3 
CEECs. We choose studies on monetary policy rules of CEECs since the asymmetric 
preferences are obtained through the estimation of monetary policy rules. 
Maria-Dolores (2005) estimated the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) in the Visegrad 
countries for the period 1998 to 2003. The generalized methods of moment (GMM) 
estimations suggested that inflation-targeting countries such as Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic validated the rule but Slovakia did not: Slovakia exhibited the most 
expansionary monetary policy operations relative to the euro area. 
Paez-Farrell (2007) estimated Taylor-type rules for the Visegrad countries during 
the period 2001 to 2006. His results suggested that a policy rule involving the exchange 
rate performed well in these countries except for the Czech Republic: the speed limit 
policy identified by Walsh (2003) was useful in describing the Czech policy. 
Ghatak  and  Moore  (2008)  examined  not  only  the  Taylor  rule  but  also  the 
MacCallum rule for CEECs’ policies. It is often stressed that in the developing countries, 
monetary policy targets the monetary base, and as such they considered the MacCallum 
rule  as  a  monetary  base  rule.  According  to  their  results,  the  MacCallum  rule  was 
appropriate for the inflation-targeting countries, while the Taylor rule was suitable for 
the fixed exchange rate regime countries. They suspected the adequacy of the Taylor 
rule in analyzing the monetary policies of developing countries. 
Frömel  et  al. (2009) emphasized the importance of the exchange rate in  the 
CEECs’ policy rules. They implemented the dynamic ordinary least squares method and 
reported  that  the  CEECs’  policy  depended  on  their  exchange  rate  regime:  countries 
following a rigid exchange rate regime targeted the exchange rate, while those with 
more  flexible  regime  focused  on  inflation  deviation  on  the  basis  of  the  Maastricht 
criteria. 
Although these studies on CEECs’ monetary policy often contradict each other, a 
consensus could be found on the importance of the exchange rate. In the context of 
these  analyses,  we  should  also  include  the  exchange  rate  as  a  possible  factor  in 
analyzing the Visegrad countries. 
3. Models 
Analyzing with the optimization based rule, the observed path of the monetary 
policy reveals the policy maker’s preferences. The parameters of the optimization-based 
rule involve the central banker’s preferences and parameters of the underlying economic 
structures, so that the estimation of the rule enables us to recover the policy preference. 
Considering this advantage, we first introduce Surico’s (2007a) model, and then extend 
it to a small open economy. 
   4 
3.1 Surico’s (2007a) asymmetric model 
This  section  introduces  Surico’s  (2007a)  asymmetric  preference  model.  He 
adopts the Linex loss function, which includes the symmetric (quadratic) preference as 
its special case. The Linex loss is allowed to lean left or right around the origin, while 
the quadratic preference is  fixed in  an origin-symmetric formulation.
2  A Linex loss 
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(1) 
where  t  ,  t g , and  t i   denote inflation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate, 
respectively. The parameters    ,  i  , and  i     are the weights assigned to the central 
bank objectives, and   ,   , and     represent the asymmetric parameters for inflation, 
the output gap, and the interest rate that discipline the degree of leaning of the loss 
function  (see  Figure  1).  Figure  1  shows  the  asymmetric  loss  due  to  inflation 
corresponding to various values of   . If     is zero, the loss is reduced to a symmetric 
case.
3  If     takes  a  positive  value  as  in  the  middle  panel  of  the  figure,  the  central 
banker disfavors a positive deviation of inflation from its target, while a negative    
implies the opposite. 
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Eq. (2) denotes a nonlinear Phillips curve that represents the actual supply schedule in 
the European countries, where the high-downward wage rigidity promotes a trade-off 
between price and output (see Dolado et al., 2005, for the nonlinear Phillips curve). Eq. 
(2) is the standard dynamic IS curve as used in the New Keynesian context. 
Since there are no endogenous  variables  and a  discretional  central  banker is 
assumed, the intertemporal optimization boils down to a static problem. The first-order 
condition takes the following form: 
                                                   
2  The Linex loss was first introduced in monetary policy analysis by Nobay and Peel (2003). 





































































Taking second-order Taylor expansions for Eq. (4) around the point where variables are 
equivalent to their target, we obtain the following approximation: 
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where  t o   is the remainder on approximation. If all the asymmetric parameters tend to 
zero in Eq. (5), 
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From the reduction, we recognize that no asymmetry case corresponds to the simple 
rule identified by Taylor (1993). 
Rearranging Eq. (5) for  t i , we obtain the following estimation form: 
t t i
t t t t
t t t












     
    







) ( ) ( ) (
) (
) 1 ( 
      
     





, , 4 3 2 1 0








































 .      
,
)] ) (( ) [( ] ) ( ) [(














t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
i
t
g E g E
E g E g g E g v


         











       




    
where  t v   denotes the prediction error of the central bank, so that the regressors have a 
correlation with the error term. The endogeneity should be cut out with the orthogonal 















   and  6 2    .         
Although it is not our focus, the nonlinearity of the Phillips curve is also tested 
by the coefficient  5    since this parameter is directly related to the nonlinearity (Surico, 
2007). Since the variance component, omitted in the simple rule, is implicitly included 
as squared terms of the variables, specification (7) would be a better representation of   6 
the monetary policy rule for Visegrad countries. 
3.2 Extension to a small open economy 
The previous section introduced the pure model of Surico (2007a). This section 
extends the model to a small open economy in order to consider the exchange rate 
component in the monetary policy rule for the Visegrad countries. 
Although a Linex loss is assumed as before, we add an exchange rate asymmetry 
to  the  objective.  Calvo  and  Reinhard  (2002)  and  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2004) 
investigated the intervention of the central bank in the foreign exchange rate market. 























































































where  t s    denotes the exchange rate difference and     corresponds to the asymmetry 
in the exchange rate. 
The economic structure is the same as before—a nonlinear Phillips curve and a 
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In addition to these, we also assume a uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) as follows: 
f
t t t i i s    .   
The central banker manipulates its operational interest rate, while taking these economic 
structures as given. For the same reason as in the previous section, this optimization is 
reduced to a static problem, and we obtain the following first-order condition: 


























































































   
Taking a second-order Taylor expansion around the point of the variables corresponding 
to their targets,   7 
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And  rearranging  Eq.  (9)  with  the  nominal  interest  rate,  we  obtain  the  following 
estimation equation: 
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t v   denotes the prediction error of the central bank so that regressor endogeneity 















     and  7 2    .       
In this model, the exchange rate difference is represented by the difference between the 
domestic and the euro area’s interest rates, and the coefficient of the term represents the 
asymmetric preference of the exchange rate toward the euro area. 
4. Estimation 
This section shows the estimation results. The starting period for all countries is 
January 1999, which marked the launching of euro as the currency for Europe and the 
commencement of the ECB’s monetary policy. This period seems to be appropriate in 
considering the exchange rate relative to the euro area. In addition, considering the 
availability  of  data,  the  ending  periods  are  October  2009  for  the  Czech  Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland and December 2008 for Slovakia. These monthly datasets were   8 
obtained from Eurostat. Inflation is measured as the annual percentage change of the 
harmonized  index  of  consumer  prices,  and  the  output  gap  is  estimated  as  the 
―quasi-real-time output gap,‖ as suggested by Orphanides and van Norden (2002). The 
quasi-real-time output gap reflects the actual data revision of the central bank, with 
information  up  to  t  -  1  used  to  forecast  the  potential  output  gap  in  period  t.  The 
Hodrick-Prescott  filter  is  used  on  the  log  of  industrial  production  in  this  recursive 
detrending.  Moreover,  a  three-month  market  interest  rate  is  used  as  an  operational 
instrument of the central bank for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia and the 
two-week MNB rate for Hungary. For the euro area’s interest rate, a three-month market 
rate is also used. 
In estimating the monetary policy rule, the GMM is implemented because both 
the Surico (2007a) and extended models are subject to endogeneity of regressors. Also, 
in  order  to  obtain  consistent  parameters  for  a  possible  serial  correlation,  the 
Newey-West  heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation  consistent  variance  covariance 
matrix  is  used.  Moreover,  we  also  show  the  results  with  one-  and  six-month-ahead 
inflation for the robustness of the model estimation.
4 
4.1 Results of Surico’s (2007a) model 
Table 2a-d reports the results of Surico’s (2007a) model. These results indicate 
the model’s adequacy and robustness over the inflation horizon of the Czech Republic 
and Poland, while the results of Hungary and Slovakia are far inferior to those of the 
former  two  countries.  These  insufficient  results  suggest  the  possibility  of  omitted 
variables, especially in the monetary policy of Hungary and Slovakia. A reconsideration 
of previous studies suggests that the exchange rate seems to be the first candidate. 
Although it is difficult to find a pattern in the asymmetric preferences of all 
Visegrad  countries,  the  Czech  Republic  and  Poland  show  a  common  tendency  of 
asymmetries: the interest rate asymmetry takes positive and significant values in almost 
all estimations. This suggests that the central banks of both countries disfavor interest 
rates above the reference value, and prefer an expansionary monetary policy. 
Unfortunately,  the  closed  economy  model  does  not  sufficiently  outline  a 
monetary policy for the V-4. In the next section, we estimate the extended model of 
Surico (2007a) in order to examine the importance of the exchange rate in designing a 
monetary policy for the Visegrad countries. 
 
                                                   
4  The instruments used for all estimations in this paper are between two and four lags of endogenous 
regressors. Most first-stage F values far exceed 10 so that the weak instrument problem seems to be 
avoided.   9 
4.2 Extended model 
Previous  estimations  showed  an  insufficiency  of  the  asymmetric  preference 
model  in  Hungary  and  Slovakia.  This  section  examines  the  extended model,  which 
incorporates the exchange rate relative to the euro area to improve the result. 
Tables 3a-d show the results of the extended model. These results exhibit an 
improvement in the fitness of the model for all the V-4 countries, including Hungary 
and Slovakia: the added exchange rate component is strongly significant and robust for 
all the countries. Therefore, we could also confirm the consensus in the literature on the 
importance of the exchange rate for a monetary policy rule of the CEECs. 
Moreover, a positive asymmetry in the interest rate and a negative asymmetry in 
the  exchange  rate  are  apparent  in  all  the  V-4  countries.  Monetary  policies  of  the 
Visegrad Four are characterized by an aversion to interest rates above the reference 
value and a preference for nominal exchange rate depreciation relative to the euro area. 
These two asymmetries are considered to be conflicting preferences. In other words, the 
asymmetry in interest rates suggests an expansionary stance of the central bank, while 
the asymmetry in exchange rates shows a tight monetary policy, since the aversion to 
higher interest rates implies a tendency to maintain the interest below its reference value, 
and the preference for currency depreciation indicates that it will be maintained above 
the euro area’s interest rate. The Visegrad countries have determined their policy rule in 
a trade-off between the interest rate and the exchange rate.
5 
The V-4’s preferred policy rule supports the extended model. In the next section, 
we  examine  if  the  recent  financial  crisis  affected  the  results  and  the  asymmetric 
preferences of the V-4. 
4.3 The financial crisis and asymmetric preferences in the Visegrad Four 
This section discusses subsample estimations in order to identify the financial 
crisis effects on the monetary policy of the Visegrad countries. To this end, a subsample 
excluding the period beginning from January 2007 to the end is used.
6  Comparing the 
results from the full sample and the subsample, we could observe the financial effect on 
our extended model. 
Tables 4a-d show the results of the subsample estimations. Although the results 
for the Czech Republic seem to be slightly inferior to those of the full sample,
7  all 
                                                   
5  Although this is not our focus, the parameter  5  , which disciplines the nonlinearity of the Phillips 
curve, is also significant in most countries implying a nonlinearity of the supply schedule in the V-4. 
6  Cecchetti (2008, p. 12) suggests that sub-prime mortgage loans started to record losses from 
February 2007. 
7  Even though the baseline in the Czech Republic is slightly sensitive, the results on inflation 
forecasts are the same as in the full sample.   10 
tendencies  do  not  change.  Therefore,  the  robustness  of  the  extended  V-4  model  is 
unchallenged. 
Regarding the crisis effects on asymmetries, Table 5 shows the distance between 
full-sample  and  subsample  asymmetries  and  the  sign  of  their  products.  Given  the 
significance  of  the  distance,  if  the  sign  becomes  positive,  then  the  policy  stance  is 
strengthened by the crisis, while the negative sign denotes that the stance is turned 
around. The table shows that while Czech preferences do not show any change during 
the financial crisis, almost all the preferences change significantly in Poland, where the 
inflation asymmetry is positive before the crisis but takes on negative values in the full 
sample.  In  other  words,  a  disinflationary  preference  is  reversed  to  an  inflationary 
preference as a result of the crisis. In addition, both aversion to higher interest rates and 
preference for nominal exchange depreciation are strengthened by the crisis. Slovakia is 
not affected where interest and exchange rate asymmetries are concerned. However, 
these two preferences are reinforced in Hungary, as in the case of Poland. 
5. Conclusion 
This  paper  adopts  Surico’s  (2007a)  asymmetric  preference  model  for  the 
Visegrad  countries  in  order  to  consider  the  volatility  component  of  their  monetary 
policies.  We  extend  the  model  to  a  small  open  economy  in  order  to  consider  the 
exchange rate for the Visegrad policies as suggested by many earlier studies on the 
CEECs. We first adopt Surico’s (2007a) model, and then the extended model. 
GMM  estimations  support  the  modification:  the  added  component  of  the 
exchange rate is strong-significant for all the V-4 countries. In addition, the estimations 
of the extended model provide two assured preferences: an aversion to interest rates 
above the reference value and a preference for domestic currency depreciation relative 
to the euro area. These preferences conflict with each other, since the former requires an 
expansionary  policy  stance,  while  the  latter  implies  a  tight  policy.  Moreover,  the 
subsample estimations suggest a large swing in the asymmetric preferences of the Polish 
policy during the recent financial crisis, while the Czech Republic exhibits no change in 
its asymmetric preferences. 
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Table I: Volatility Ratio Toward the Euro Area 
Relative variance
Var(i) / Var(iEA) 2.44 *** 12.89 *** 26.01 *** 12.89 ***
Var() / Var(EA) 8.58 *** 34.21 *** 19.13 *** 34.21 ***
Var(y) / Var(yEA) 8.31 *** 6.95 *** 2.77 *** 6.95 ***
Slovakia       Czech Republic   Hungary Poland
 
Note: *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance.   15 
 
Table IIa: Surico’s (2007a) Model for Czech Republic 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 4.90 *** 4.89 *** 4.79 ***
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
1 0.04 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3 0.16 ** 0.14 ** 0.20 ***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
4 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
5 0.00 0.00 0.02 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
6 -0.34 *** -0.35 *** -0.36 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
i 0.84 *** 0.84 *** 0.85 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
 -0.16 ** -0.13 ** -0.22
(0.06) (0.06) (0.15)
 -0.17 -0.38 -0.29 *
(0.30) (0.34) (0.15)
 0.68 *** 0.69 *** 0.72 ***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
J-stat 10.47 9.82 11.29  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  16 
 
Table IIb: Surico’s (2007a) Model for Hungary 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 7.52 *** 7.98 *** 10.08 ***
(0.81) (0.51) (0.94)
1 -0.58 -0.59 ** 0.51 *
(0.41) (0.29) (0.29)
2 -0.06 -0.04 0.00
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
3 0.57 *** 0.41 ** 0.98 **
(0.17) (0.19) (0.40)
4 0.17 0.06 -0.06
(0.13) (0.08) (0.14)
5 0.12 0.04 0.38 **
(0.07) (0.04) (0.15)
6 0.06 * 0.10 *** -0.16 **
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07)
i 0.88 *** 0.84 *** 0.93 ***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02)
 0.21 *** 0.15 *** -0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
 0.60 0.28 -0.12
(0.56) (0.47) (0.29)
 -0.11 * -0.19 *** 0.32 **
(0.06) (0.04) (0.14)
J-stat 10.88 9.12 8.78  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, **the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  17 
 
Table IIc: Surico’s (2007a) Model for Poland 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 8.99 *** 9.26 *** 11.95 ***
(0.51) (0.89) (1.50)
1 0.21 ** 0.18 0.20
(0.09) (0.18) (0.18)
2 -0.04 *** -0.16 *** -0.09 ***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
3 2.21 *** 2.48 *** 2.47 ***
(0.14) (0.23) (0.63)
4 0.18 *** 0.21 *** 0.30 **
(0.05) (0.06) (0.13)
5 -0.10 * -0.34 *** 0.08
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
6 -0.05 ** -0.04 -0.08 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
i 0.89 *** 0.89 *** 0.90 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
 -0.35 -1.74 -0.87
(0.22) (1.72) (0.85)
 0.16 *** 0.17 *** 0.25 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
 0.11 ** 0.08 0.16 ***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
J-stat 11.55 11.59 6.69  
Notes: (i) *** denotes 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  18 
 
Table IId: Surico’s (2007a) Model for Slovakia 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 3.66 *** 6.96 *** 9.76
(1.18) (1.84) (6.23)
1 0.51 * 0.63 0.03
(0.31) (0.51) (1.22)
2 0.03 -0.09 *** -0.14
(0.04) (0.03) (0.23)
3 -0.06 -1.07 -1.89
(0.34) (0.65) (3.35)
4 0.01 -0.04 -0.99
(0.03) (0.07) (1.53)
5 0.11 0.30 * -0.08
(0.11) (0.18) (0.45)
6 0.00 -0.19 ** 0.00
(0.05) (0.09) (0.13)
i 0.95 *** 0.97 *** 0.99 ***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
 0.12 -0.27 -7.87
(0.15) (0.23) (273.58)
 -0.31 0.07 1.05
(1.28) (0.14) (1.02)
 0.00 0.39 ** -0.01
(0.11) (0.17) (0.27)
J-stat 11.34 9.90 8.71  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  19 
Table IIIa: Extended Model for Czech Republic 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 4.69 *** 4.63 *** 5.15 ***
(0.19) (0.28) (0.16)
1 0.04 *** 0.09 *** 0.06 ***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
2 0.00 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 **
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3 0.10 0.26 *** 0.12 ***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.03)
4 -0.03 ** -0.05 * -0.08 ***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
5 -0.01 *** -0.03 ** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
6 -0.41 *** -0.44 *** -0.36 ***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.03)
7 0.12 *** 0.16 ** 0.20 ***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.03)
s -0.21 ** -0.03 0.10 ***
(0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
i 0.63 *** 0.78 *** 0.64 ***
(0.11) (0.04) (0.04)
 -0.12 * -0.09 ** -0.07 **
(0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
 -0.61 * -0.39 * -1.39 ***
(0.35) (0.21) (0.39)
 0.81 *** 0.88 *** 0.71 ***
(0.09) (0.15) (0.06)
 -0.23 *** -0.32 ** -0.40 ***
(0.08) (0.13) (0.05)
J-stat 6.59 8.53 13.00  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and *the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  20 
Table IIIb: Extended Model for Hungary 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 14.15 *** 15.13 *** 18.96 ***
(0.57) (0.80) (0.92)
1 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3 0.03 -0.04 -0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02)
4 0.05 *** 0.06 *** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
5 -0.01 *** -0.01 ** 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
6 -0.10 *** -0.09 *** -0.06 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
7 0.08 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 ***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
s 0.38 *** 0.34 *** 0.49 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
i 0.21 *** 0.31 *** 0.07 *
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
 0.16 -52.82 -0.84
(0.20) (25389) (8.65)
 3.59 -2.99 -0.80
(4.80) (3.93) (1.30)
 0.19 *** 0.18 *** 0.12 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
 -0.15 *** -0.15 *** -0.14 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
J-stat 9.27 8.12 7.56  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and *the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions   21 
Table IIIc: Extended Model for Poland 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 10.34 *** 8.80 *** 8.19 ***
(0.95) (0.69) (0.49)
1 0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
2 -0.01 ** -0.02 *** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
3 0.71 *** 0.46 *** -0.16 **
(0.15) (0.16) (0.08)
4 0.12 *** -0.01 -0.14 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
5 -0.09 *** -0.14 *** -0.03 *
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
6 -0.13 *** -0.15 *** -0.18 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
7 0.13 *** 0.19 *** 0.25 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
s 0.20 *** 0.25 *** 0.33 ***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
i 0.60 *** 0.51 *** 0.40 ***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
 -1.02 9.32 0.86
(2.18) (88.28) (2.53)
 0.33 *** -0.05 1.79 **
(0.10) (0.12) (0.87)
 0.25 *** 0.31 *** 0.36 ***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
 -0.25 *** -0.38 *** -0.51 ***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
J-stat 6.43 8.31 8.51  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  22 
Table IIId: Extended Model for Slovakia 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 11.03 *** 11.07 *** 12.51 ***
(0.84) (0.88) (1.46)
1 -0.07 *** -0.04 ** -0.09 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
2 -0.01 ** -0.01 *** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3 0.15 ** 0.10 0.03
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
4 -0.01 ** -0.01 * -0.02 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
5 0.00 0.02 ** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
6 -0.11 *** -0.11 *** -0.10 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
7 0.12 *** 0.13 *** 0.11 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
s 0.54 *** 0.49 *** 0.49 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
i -0.06 0.05 0.00
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
 0.28 ** 0.32 0.08
(0.11) (0.21) (0.08)
 -0.14 *** -0.22 *** -1.31
(0.03) (0.08) (1.59)
 0.22 *** 0.22 *** 0.19 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
 -0.25 *** -0.25 *** -0.21 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
J-stat 7.67 11.31 6.70  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance,** the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  23 
Table IVa: Excluding the Crisis for Czech Republic 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 5.05 *** 5.23 *** 5.27 ***
(0.43) (0.94) (0.29)
1 0.02 0.31 *** -0.04
(0.06) (0.11) (0.03)
2 0.00 -0.01 * 0.00 **
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
3 0.26 ** 0.95 * 0.35 ***
(0.12) (0.54) (0.10)
4 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
5 -0.03 * -0.16 *** -0.02 *
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
6 -0.36 *** -0.49 ** -0.32 ***
(0.05) (0.23) (0.03)
7 0.18 *** 0.41 ** 0.27 ***
(0.06) (0.21) (0.03)
s 0.05 0.29 *** 0.20 ***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
i 0.67 *** 0.49 *** 0.49 ***
(0.07) (0.11) (0.05)
 -0.09 -0.07 *** -0.19 ***
(0.12) (0.02) (0.07)
 -0.20 -0.10 -0.19
(0.34) (0.21) (0.26)
 0.72 *** 0.98 ** 0.65 ***
(0.11) (0.45) (0.05)
 -0.36 *** -0.82 ** -0.54 ***
(0.12) (0.42) (0.06)
J-stat 8.17 5.53 9.06  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  24 
Table IVb: Excluding the Crisis for Hungary 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 17.71 *** 18.13 *** 21.15 ***
(0.87) (0.62) (0.63)
1 0.03 ** 0.03 *** 0.03 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
4 0.02 ** 0.01 0.01 *
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
5 -0.01 -0.01 ** -0.01 ***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
6 -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.05 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
7 0.07 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
s 0.42 *** 0.43 *** 0.53 ***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
i 0.16 *** 0.13 *** -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
 0.11 ** 0.15 *** 0.26 ***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
 -2.36 -1.09 -0.19 **
(5.13) (1.48) (0.10)
 0.14 *** 0.13 *** 0.11 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
 -0.13 *** -0.13 *** -0.13 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
J-stat 8.76 7.65 8.64  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and *the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  25 
Table IVc: Excluding the Crisis for Poland 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 31.35 *** 32.39 *** 34.30 ***
(2.90) (2.63) (6.66)
1 0.00 0.00 -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3 0.14 *** 0.16 *** 0.12 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
4 -0.01 ** -0.01 -0.01 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
5 -0.01 ** -0.01 ** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
6 -0.03 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
7 0.05 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
s 0.54 *** 0.51 *** 0.54 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
i 0.02 0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
 3.33 -0.48 -0.09
(54.71) (2.06) (0.18)
 -0.20 -0.10 -0.21
(0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
 0.07 0.06 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
J-stat 9.22 7.70 7.09  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance. 
(ii) J-stat denotes the j statistic for the overidentifying restrictions.  26 
Table IVd: Excluding the Crisis for Slovakia 
Parameters Baseline l = 1 l = 6
0 10.89 *** 11.13 *** 11.10 ***
(0.20) (0.18) (0.23)
1 -0.04 *** -0.03 *** -0.03 *
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3 -0.04 *** -0.02 -0.05 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
4 0.01 *** 0.01 *** -0.02 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
5 0.01 ** 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
6 -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.11 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
7 0.12 *** 0.12 *** 0.13 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
s 0.50 *** 0.47 *** 0.43 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
i -0.01 0.06 *** 0.13 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
 -0.24 * 0.04 0.09
(0.13) (0.10) (0.22)
 -0.34 *** -1.01 0.65 *
(0.09) (0.67) (0.34)
 0.25 *** 0.23 *** 0.23 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
 -0.24 *** -0.25 *** -0.25 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
J-stat 7.24 5.86 7.69  
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and *the 10% significance. 





Table V: Asymmetric Preferences and the Financial Crisis 
Country
Distance Sign Distance Sign Distance Sign Distance Sign
full , sub 0.03 + 0.05 + 4.34 – 0.52 *** –
(0.13) (0.21) (54.76) (0.17)
full , sub 0.41 + 5.95 – 0.52 *** – 0.20 ** +
(0.49) (7.02) (0.15) (0.10)
full , sub 0.09 + 0.05 *** + 0.19 *** + 0.03 +
(0.14) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
full ,sub 0.12 + 0.02 ** + 0.16 *** + 0.01 +
(0.15) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
               Czech republic                Hungary              Poland            Slovak republic
 
Notes: (i) *** denotes the 1% significance, ** the 5% significance, and * the 10% significance. 
(ii) The column Sign gives the sign of the variable ( sub full   * ).   28 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Asymmetric loss functions corresponds to asymmetric parameters 
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